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Abstract
Energy is one of the main elements that allows society to maintain its living standards and continue as usual. For
this reason, the energy distribution is both one of the most important and targeted by attacks Critical Infrastructure.
Many of the other Critical Infrastructures rely on energy to work reliably. Some states are particularly interested in
getting stealth access to -and take control of- energy production and distribution of other Nations. This way they
can create huge disruption and get a significant advantage in case of conflict. In the recent past, we could observe
some real-life demonstrations of this fact. The introduction of smart grids and ICT in the management of energy
infrastructures has great benefits but also introduces new attack surfaces and ways for attackers to gain control. As
a benefit, we can also collect more data and metrics to better understand the state of the grid. New techniques based
on Artificial Intelligence and machine learning can take advantage of the available data to help the protection of the
infrastructures and detect ongoing threats. Smart Meters which are connected intelligent devices spread over the
grid and the geographical distribution of the population. For this reason, they can be very useful data collection
assets but also a target for attack. In this paper, the authors consider and analyze various innovative techniques that
can be used to enhance the security and reliability of Smart Grids.
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1. Introduction
Energy, and in particular electricity, is one of the fundamental building blocks for modern societies. According to a
report from ENISA, Energy is the only sector, together with transport, that is recognized as critical by all 18
considered European States (Mattioli & Levy-Bencheton, 2014). Most other sectors, if not all, depend directly or
indirectly on Energy to function on a day-to-day basis.
Energy sector is both one of the most affected by cyber-crime, and one of the most costly in all affected sectors
(Tofan, NIKOLAKOPOULOS, & Darra, 2016) (Ponemon, 2019).
In the last two decades, we have seen cyber-attacks and incidents of various magnitudes of impacts on each and
every sector (F-Secure, 2019) concerning energy production (Wallace & McClure, 2014), transmission and
distribution. Gas (Reed, 2004) and Oil industries (Hacquebord & Pernet, 2019), utilities and even nuclear power
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plants (Kesler, 2011) have been hit by targeted or untargeted attacks. Many other incidents might very likely have
been kept undisclosed to the general public or not discovered at all.
More and more Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups, especially the ones following nation-states objectives,
are becoming active and stealthily infiltrating Critical Infrastructure to steal information or just keeping a foothold
inside the systems to quickly act in case of escalading warfare (e.g. to create disruption).
It is complex to efficiently identify security threats. Studies show that security breaches are in average discovered
only dozen to hundreds of days after the initial intrusion, if at all. While the trends show a decreasing of the
detection time in the last five years, it is still unacceptable high ( FireEye , 2019). Smart Grids are complex systems
and tricky to monitor. To quote the head of information security at Enel Italy: “We have huge background noise in
the identification of cyber threats. Enel's global IT security infrastructure identifies more than 100,000 events a
day” (Bundock, 2015). These numbers can be easily overwhelming and cover the real threats, especially if skilled
attackers make their best to hide their traces inside the noise. Artificial Intelligence techniques could help
improving the detection rates.
The document is structured as follow: section 2 briefly describes some notable recent attacks against various energy
infrastructures around the world. Section3 gives an introductory overview of the Smart Grid, and its characteristics.
In section 4 is performed an analysis of various Smart Grid threats, where a review of possible solutions follows
each issue considered. This section also lists some commercial solutions already in the market that can enhance the
security of various aspects of the Smart Grid using Artificial Intelligence techniques. Section 5 concludes the paper
with final considerations and closing remarks.
2. Notable Attacks Against Energy Infrastructure
Recent years have seen a growing number of cyber-attacks targeting various infrastructures and enterprises of the
energy sector. Sophisticated malware and toolkits have been developed specifically to hit just some specific
systems. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of some of the most notorious and notable attacks of the past years,
in order to better understand the context and the hazards surrounding the sector.
Stuxnet - Stuxnet is a malware first discovered in 2010 on an Iranian computer, and became the most notorious
example of extremely sophisticated malwares targeting industrial components. It was designed to specifically
sabotage centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear facility of Natanz and disrupt the uranium enrichment process.
Exploiting four zero-day vulnerabilities on Windows, Stuxnet modified the parameters that limited the maximum
spin speed of the nuclear centrifuges (Langner, 2013). This leaded to the destruction of about one fifth of the
Iranian’s nuclear centrifuges. While the main target of the malware was that specific facility, it was later identified
in other energy plants.
Shamoon - Shamoon is the name given to a malware that targeted Saudi Aramco (oil, Saudi Arabia) and RasGas
(natural gas, Qatar) systems in 2012 (BRONK & TIKK–RINGAS, 2013), making thousands of workstations
unusable and disrupting operations. An enhanced version of the malware, called Shamoon 2.0, targeted various
organizations in Saudi Arabia starting from 2016 (Kaspersky Lab, 2017). A furtherly improved version, called
Shamoon 3, hit the Italian oil company Saipem in December 2018 (Blueliv, 2019).
Dragonfly/Havex - Havex is a Remote Access Trojan (RAT), a malware category that aims to control a system
through a remote network connection. An espionage campaign organised by the Dragonfly group leveraged Havex
malware to collect information targeting different industry sectors, among which the energy. Havex is estimated to
have impacted as many as 2000 infrastructure sites, a majority of which were in Europe and the United States
(Nelson, 2016).
BlackEnergy - BlackEnergy malware is a botnet that evolved over time, starting from a web-based distributed
DDoS platform to a plugin architecture. One of the most relevant attack conducted with BlackEnergy was against a
regional Ukrainian electricity distribution company (Lee, Assante, Conway, 2016). The malware infected the
SCADA systems of the company and on the 23th December 2015 several electrical substations were disconnected
for about 3 hours, leaving more than 200,000 customers without electricity during a cold winter day.
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Industroyer - Industroyer, also known as CrashOverride, is one of the biggest malware threat to critical
infrastructures. Like BlackEnergy malware, Industroyer has been designed to attack the ICSs used in electrical
substations. The developers of Industroyer malware were people with a deep knowledge of ICS and probably an
access to the specific equipment used in the targeted electricity industry. Industroyer targeted the Ukraine’s power
grid causing a blackout in Kiev (Dragos, 2017).
TRITON - TRITON is another example of identified malicious software developed to target safety instrumented
systems (SIS). This malware consists of a python script depending on a zip file containing several libraries, among
which the modified Triconex framework to interact with the Schneider Electric Triconex safety systems. The
targeted systems are the ones responsible of the last line of defense of critical systems, such as petrochemical
plants, water treatment facilities and nuclear plant (Dragos, 2017). TRITON is possibly the first malware designed
aiming to put lives at risk.
Most of the presented attacks exploited either the Industrial Control Systems used for the automation of processes
or the ICT and software components, all of them being integral part of the Smart Grid concept described in next
section. A comprehensive list of cyber-attacks involving energy infrastructures is available in (ECSO, 2018).
3. Smart Grid and the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
The main focus of this paper is specifically on the Smart Grid. As a matter of fact, the traditional power generation
and transmission systems were no more sufficient to cover the new requirement introduced by modern cities and
societies. The new paradigm of Smart Grid, based on the availability of new information streams used to control
the stability and reliability of the power supply, and to offer new enhanced services and markets (Demand-
Response, Transactive Energy, etc), is implemented by the introduction of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
(AMI).
The AMI is actually the integration of ICT, ICS and IoT technologies into the legacy “dumb” power systems. A
schematic overview of the components and technologies involved in a modern AMI is visible in Figure 1.
Smart grids are then the interconnection of complex systems composed by heterogeneous devices and linked
together by many different types of transmission mediums and protocols.
3/1/2021 View of Artificial Intelligence Techniques to Prevent Cyber Attacks on Smart Grids | Annals of Disaster Risk Sciences
https://ojs.vvg.hr/index.php/adrs/article/view/42/37 4/9
Figure 1. Main components of Advanced Measure Infrastructure (INCIBE, 2017)
While newer protocols support –but not always enforce- security mechanisms like encryption or mutual
authentication, legacy protocols usually don’t even support basic security (Collantes & Padilla, 2015) (INCIBE,
2017), leaving the doors open to multiple kind of attacks.
4. Threats of the Smart Grid and Defensive Techniques
The Smart Grid is made by physical components, like power generators, and digital controller and connecting
assets. Given the complexity of the smart grid systems, different strategies could be used to disrupt its normal
function. The actors and causes that can be source of threat for Smart Grids are multiple and of different origin. A
detailed review is presented in (Otuoze, Mustafa, & Larik, 2018). (Gunduz & Das, 2018) divide attacks in two
classes: passive and active attacks. Passive attacks are used to obtain information about the system configuration,
architecture and behavior through eavesdropping techniques. Active attacks aim to affect the normal operations of
the system. A survey of cyber-security challenges that involve Smart Grid is done in (Lopez, Sargolzaei, Santana,
& Huerta, 2015). Other threats, involving more the traditional ICT components, are considered in (El Mrabet,
Kaabouch, El Ghazi, & El Ghazi, 2018). Only a subset of those are considered in this paper. In particular, we
consider the threats that pose serious menaces to the whole infrastructure, ignoring threats to customer’s privacy,
passive espionage and similar issues.
A general Artificial Intelligence concept that is applicable for the identification of malicious activities is
the Anomaly Detection. The purpose of anomaly detection algorithms is to identify rare events, that in this context
represents things like the suspicious behaviors of some user or device, unusual network traffic or similar.This
methodology can be applied to single aspects of the Smart Grid at a time or using a holistic approach, that means
considering the behavior of the whole system at a time.
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An example of the latter approach is presented in (Marino, et al., 2019). Authors of that research used a simulation
platform, with Hardware-in-the-Loop, to generate data describing both physical and “cyber” behaviors of a grid
configuration. Using the generated data, they were able to implement machine learning algorithms able to reliably
identify multiple kinds of ongoing attacks. The convenience of the technique used is that only normal behavior data
is required to train the algorithms. Attacks are automatically recognized as anomalous configurations and notified.
A similar methodology is also used in (Karimipour, Geris, Dehghantanha, & Leung, 2019), where unsupervisioned
machine learning algorithms are implemented so that they can discriminate between a “normal” fault and a real
cyber-attack.
In (Rossi, Chren, Buhnova, & Pitner, 2016), authors describe the results of analysis done on real smart grid data
streams collected via distributed smart meters. The research points out that it is important to consider
a collective and contextual approach to anomaly detection, while single point anomaly detection resulted to be
useless.
4.1 Threats of the Smart Grid and Defensive Techniques
This section describes some threats that involve the physical components and limitations of the power distribution
systems.
Load Altering
The electricity distribution grid is a system bound to physics laws such as Kirchhoff's rules,and must respect very
strict constraints in terms of maximum power flow, voltage, frequency and so on. In case of issues, appropriate
reactions must be taken very quickly in order to avoid cascading effects and the disruption of the service. A
distributed and coordinated altering of loads could be very harmful to the grid (Mohsenian-Rad & Leon-Garcia,
2011). The introduction of more and more pervasive IoT devices and technological Home Assistants, greatly
enhance the possibility of successfully implementing this kind of attack. (Soltan, Mittal, & Poor, 2018).
While the effects of those kind of attacks could somehow be seen by the regular controlling devices as voltage or
frequency alterations, this is not enough to precisely detect where the problem lies, and could not be easily detected
as an attack and differentiated by “regular” unbalances. Such kind of threats could only be detected by monitoring
the load of each single consumer. While smart meters could be used for this purpose, today’s smart meters just keep
track of energy –and not instant power- consumption in timeslots of 15 minutes or so. This is not enough to detect
the presented attacks. A device to do so should have the characteristics of real-time notification of significant
consumption variations, like the Event-Driven Metering presented in (Simonov, Chicco, & Zanetto, Event-driven
energy metering: Principles and applications, 2017).
A solution to this kind of attack, taking advantage of the information made available by Event-Driven Meters has
been proposed in (Simonov, Bertone, & Goga, Detecting the Manipulation of Demand via IoT, 2019), where the
density of events is used to discriminate between regular consumptions and coordinated attacks.
Time (de)Synchronization Against PMU
Phasors Measurement Units (PMU) are fundamental controlling devices used to assess and stabilize the frequency
of the AC electricity flow. They are highly dependent to a precise synchronization of the timing between PMU
deployed in different segments of the grid. To keep synchronization, GPS clock or other protocols are used.
Spoofing attacks can be used to desynchronize the PMUs and force the execution of inappropriate reactions. In this
case it is complicated to efficiently use AI mechanisms as the required reaction time is very limited. It is however
possible to identify attacked PMU in order to increase their protection by other means. A solution that define new
Time Synchronization Attacks detectors is presented in (Shereen & Dán, 2020).
Generators and Industrial Control Systems Tampering
In current grids, electricity is commonly produced using rotational generators, that can be operated by fuel, wind,
water, steam or other means. In AC networks, it is fundamental that every generating device/asset is synchronized
with the frequency of the grid. This is to protect both the grid stability and the safety of the generator. If a generator
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is forced to operate out of sync with respect to the frequency of the grid, it can suffer very strong mechanical stress,
that can quickly lead to the destruction of the device. This has been demonstrated in a controlled environment,
causing the explosion of the generator (Bernabeu & Katiraei, 2011). Moreover, this could compromise the safety of
nearby operators or casual passerby posing a serious risk of injuries and could also initiate cascading effects
leading to the shutdown of the grid and consequential blackout. The same technique of inducing mechanical stress
to physical assets can be used (and has already been demonstrated and exploited) in other contexts. Predictive
maintenance techniques based on monitoring vibrations or other environmental information could be used to detect
this kind of threats (Vanraj, Goyal, Saini, Dhami, & Pabla, 2016), (Gebraeel, Lawley, Liu, & Parmeshwaran, 2004),
(Durbhaka & Selvaraj, 2016).
4.2 Threats Against the AMI and Smart Meters
The development of malicious programs and potential unwanted applications is a known issue that is increasingly
affecting IoT devices besides common system operators (such as Windows, MacOs, Android, etc.). The
digitalization of industrial operational technology and the wide spread of IoT systems is rapidly increasing the
number of connected devices. Consequently, this increase the number of targets, most of them unprotected of
poorly protected against cyber-attacks (AV-TEST). One of the most relevant examples is the Mirai attack. The
Mirai botnet and its variants and imitators are a wake-up call to the industry to better secure Internet of Things
devices or risk exposing the Internet infrastructure to increasingly disruptive distributed denial-of-service attacks
(Kolias, Kambourakis, Stavrou, & Voas, 2017). A simulation of what could happen if a botnet of Smart Meters was
instructed to attack the central controlling server of an AMI is presented in (Sgouras, Birda, & Labridis, 2014).
Some Smart Meters are equipped with relays switches that can be remotely operated to disconnect the customer
from the grid, consequently causing a local blackout (Anderson & Fuloria, 2010). While the identification of single
malicious disconnect commands would be almost impossible, statistical analysis could be used to identify
anomalous concentrations of such commands (Simonov, Bertone, Goga, & Terzo, Cyber Kill Chain Defender for
Smart Meters, 2018).
4.3 Commercial solutions
There has been a trend towards the implementation of machine learning techniques for anomaly detection and
prevention in the networks of the ICSs, not only on the academic field but also regarding the industry offering
various commercial solutions.
DarkTrace’s Industrial Immune System for ICS implements a real-time defense for the OTs. The Industrial Immune
System is a self-learning cyber AI technology that detects novel attacks and insider threats at an early stage. It is
based on Bayesian probabilistic mathematics and leverages the capabilities of the of machine learning and AI
algorithms. The technology operates like a human immune system which identifies subtle shifts in the expected
behavior and has the ability to automatically fight against the intruders. It identifies the deviations from the learned
pattern and alerts the organization to the potential threat. The self-learning technology is protocol agnostic and can
be deployed across a range of OT environments, providing full coverage of the organization without disrupting
daily operations. By monitoring from a central location, and deploying small probe appliances into substations, it
protects entire power grids and utility systems. Regardless of network topology, a complete visibility of RTUs and
remote OT across all substations and compressors is provided. The technology models and compares behavior of
control system devices across all sites, detecting threats at the substation level, for both remote and local physical
compromise.
ReaQta has developed an Endpoint Threat Response platform based on A.I. And machine learning algorithms
which is able to detect new cyber threats, spanning from simple ransomware to more sophisticated in-memory only
attacks. The solution automates and speeds up the detection and response process, minimizing the human
interactions required. They have developed a NanoOS capable of acquiring data from the endpoints at the silicon
level while completely isolating the security layer from attackers.
ElastiGRID of ECI provides a complete multiservice platform, supporting OT and IT services over the most
appropriate transport and offers a holistic security suite that includes state of the art OT.
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5. Conclusions
The gradual introduction of ICT and IoT technologies in the energy sector, and in particular the Smart Grid,
introduces many positive effects that were not possible in the past. This nevertheless also introduces complexity
and greatly increase the attack surface available to malicious actors. Most legacy systems, that are still used and
will still be used for many more years, were not designed with security in mind and are particularly vulnerable to
the opening of new attacks from the network connections. At the same time, in recent years we have witnessed the
rise of dozens of threat groups, almost certainly for the most part following directives of some Nation-State,
infiltrating the most various Critical Infrastructures creating continuous threats to the safety and security of society.
While security measures to mitigate the new threats are being introduced and partially reduce the risk of disruptive
acts, too many breaches still occur and most of them remain undetected for months or years, and at times when it’s
already too late and the damages already happened.
Artificial Intelligence techniques can be helpful to enhance the detection rate and time of potential threats and
ongoing attacks, avoiding or mitigating the impact of disruptive incidents.
It is however fundamental to always keep in mind that there is no such thing as a “silver bullet” and no security
system is perfect. Artificial Intelligence technologies are no exception; they are just one step further in the direction
of a better security. Carefully crafted data could even be used to trick and exploit AI algorithms to do harm. The
past teaches us that highly motivated–and financed- actors can ideate the most sophisticated and creative ways to
reach their objectives, overcoming no matter what advanced security mechanism.
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